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Abstract
We test whether the binary lottery procedure makes subjects behave as if they are risk
neutral in the Holt-Laury and Eckel-Grossman tasks. Depending on the task we nd
that at most a third of subjects behave as if risk neutral. In fact, when we compare
the distribution of choices we nd no signicant di¤erence to earlier experiments in the
same lab that did not use the binary lottery procedure.
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1 Introduction
The Binary Lottery Procedure (BLP henceforth) is, in theory, an ingenious method of
inducing risk neutrality of subjects in experiments. If an experiment requires that subjects
behave as if they are risk neutral,1 one can pay them by lottery tickets rather than directly
with money. Each lottery ticket then gives subjects an objective probability of winning
a high prize in a binary lottery. If subjects satisfy two axioms (monotonicity and the
reduction of objective compound lotteries, axioms which are satised, in particular, for
expected utility maximizers),2 they should simply maximize the probability of winning the
high prize, in other words, they should maximize the expected number of lottery tickets.
Since Smith (1961) proposed and Roth and Malouf (1979) implemented (and indepen-
dently proposed) the BLP, many experimenters have employed it in order to induce risk
neutrality.3 However, after Selten et al. (1999) found in an experiment that the BLP did
not work at all as intended, the use of the BLP by experimenters came to an e¤ective halt.
Recently, there seems to be some kind of resurrection of the method. Harrison et al. (2013)
have re-examined the procedure and found evidence that, at least, it moves risk prefer-
ences towards risk neutrality. This has in turn inspired the use of its premise for incentive
compatible belief elicitation (see Hossain and Okui, 2013; Schlag and van der Weele, 2013),
also discussed in Schotter and Trevino (2014). Given the conicting evidence, it seems
appropriate to give the method another test.
We test the BLP in combination with two of the most popular experimental methods
to measure risk attitudes, the Holt and Laury (2002) method and the Eckel and Grossman
(2002) method.4 These are both standard risk preference elicitation tasks that are used in
numerous experimental papers.5 If the BLP actually succeeds in making subjects behave
as if they are risk neutral, we should observe only one type of choice: the choice that
maximizes the expected number of lottery tickets. The short answer is: this is not what
we observe. In fact, not even half the subjects (depending on the method between 17%
and 34%) behave as if they are risk neutral. The share of subjects who behave as if they
are risk neutral across both tasks is only 10%.
1Often, theories are to be tested under the auxiliary assumption that subjects are risk neutral.
2See Selten et al. (1999) for formal statements.
3 It was also discussed in various experimental textbooks (e.g. Kagel and Roth, 1995), while Berg et al.
(2008) specically argue strongly for its merits.
4The latter method was originally developed by Binswanger (1980).
5For recent surveys of risk preference elicitation see Charness et al. (2013) and Holt and Laury (2014)
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We also compare the proportion of risk neutral choices to other studies that have
been implemented in recent years utilizing the same subject pool in our laboratory. In
these comparison studies, the two risk elicitation tasks were using prize money rather than
lottery tickets as is standard in the literature so we can contrast the proportion of risk
neutral choices while implementing BLP (in our current data) and while not (comparison
studies). The results clearly show that implementing the BLP does not result in a signicant
di¤erence in the proportion of risk neutral choices.
Thus, we nd neither support for Selten et al. (1999), who concluded that the BLP
makes things worse, nor for Harrison et al. (2013), who stated that the BLP moved decisions
at least in the right direction. Instead, it does not seem to make any noticeable di¤erence
in our experiment.
2 Experimental Design
In total 119 subjects participated in our experiment. Subjects were recruited via hroot
(Bock et al., 2014) from the subject pool of the experimental lab at the economics depart-
ment of the University of Heidelberg. We ran a total of 6 sessions with pen and paper.6
Instructions are included in the appendix.
The two risk elicitation tasks administered were one Eckel and Grossman (2002) type
task and one multiple price list type task (Holt and Laury, 2002). All participants were
asked to respond to both risk elicitation tasks. Participants were informed that only one
of the two elicitation tasks would be the payo¤ relevant one and this would be determined
at the end of the experiment by a coin toss conducted by one of the participants.7 The
participants received a show-up fee of 5 Euro and could earn an additional 5 Euro depending
on their decisions and the lottery realizations.
The binary lottery procedure was implemented as follows. Instead of listing lotteries
for monetary prizes, we let subjects choose among lotteries that paid out tokens. Each
token then corresponded to a probability of 0.01 for winning the monetary prize of 5 Euro.
The instructions explicitly mentioned that the greater number of tokens they earn, the
higher the chance for winning a prize of 5 Euro. For example, if a subject won 72 tokens,
6For the rst two sessions of the data reported, participants had just completed an unrelated experiment
and were asked if they were willing to spend few more minutes in the lab and participate in a new short
experiment. These subjects did not receive an additional show-up fee.
7This procedure is incentive-compatible under fairly mild conditions. In particular, subjects are assumed
to respect rst-order stochastic dominance, see Azrieli et al. (2019) and the literature cited there.
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he had a probability of 0.72 of winning 5 Euro. This was implemented by letting each
subject throw two 10-sided dice, one determining the tens and one determining the ones.
If the subjects rolled any number below or equal to 72, he would win 5 Euro.
For the Eckel and Grossman (2002) task, Table 1 lists the 4 lotteries the participants
had to choose from. Participants were asked to choose their preferred one out of the four
lotteries listed. Each lottery had a 50% chance to reward the participants with either the
low or high prize and this was determined by a coin ip at the end. If tokens were monetary
prizes, choosing lotteries 1 or 2 would be indicative of risk averse preferences as they entail
lower (or even zero) variance, choosing lottery 3 implies risk neutrality as it is the lottery
that maximizes expected value and nally, choosing lottery 4 is indicative of risk seeking
behavior as it is the lottery with the highest variance and a lower expected value than
lottery 3.
Table 1: Eckel and Grossman Lottery Task: Participants choose one of the lotteries 1-4
Lottery Tokens if coin shows Heads Tokens if coin shows Tails Exp. value
1 38 38 38
2 52 28 40
3 72 16 44
4 84 0 42
Note: Each lottery has equal chance of either outcome, determined by a coin ip.
For the Holt and Laury (2002) task, Table 2 displays the choice list participants were
faced with. Participants had to choose option A or B for each of the 10 situations listed.
The last column lists the di¤erence in expected values of lotteries A and B. This was not
shown to subjects. Any participant who wants to maximize expected value would choose
Lottery A for rows 1 through 4 and then switch to Lottery B for rows 5-10. We call the last
row for which a participant chose Lottery A the switch point.8 If tokens were monetary
prizes, participants with switch point of less than 4 would be classied as risk seekers, those
with a switch point of 4 would be classied as risk neutral, and those with a switch point
higher than 4 as risk averse.9
The payment of subjects was conducted as follows. First, one subject in each session
8Participants who switched more than once were coded as having made a mistake. We excluded 9 of the
119 subject due to this reason when reporting results for Holt-Laury. If we instead code multiple switchers
by their rst switching point, results become even stronger (see Table 4).
9Participants who always choose Lottery B have a switch point of 0. A switch point of 10 (always choose
A) would imply a dominated choice for the last row.
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Table 2: Holt and Laury Lottery Task: Participants choose one of the lotteries A or B for
each of the 10 possible situations
Lottery A Your Lottery B EV (A) 
choice EV (B)
1
40 tokens if the die shows 1
32 tokens if the die shows 2-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1
2 tokens if the die shows 2-10
23: 3
2
40 tokens if the die shows 1-2
32 tokens if the die shows 3-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-2
2 tokens if the die shows 3-10
16: 6
3
40 tokens if the die shows 1-3
32 tokens if the die shows 4-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-3
2 tokens if the die shows 4-10
9: 9
4
40 tokens if the die shows 1-4
32 tokens if the die shows 5-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-4
2 tokens if the die shows 5-10
3: 2
5
40 tokens if the die shows 1-5
32 tokens if the die shows 6-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-5
2 tokens if the die shows 6-10
 3: 5
6
40 tokens if the die shows 1-6
32 tokens if the die shows 7-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-6
2 tokens if the die shows 7-10
 10: 2
7
40 tokens if the die shows 1-7
32 tokens if the die shows 8-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-7
2 tokens if the die shows 8-10
 16: 9
8
40 tokens if the die shows 1-8
32 tokens if the die shows 9-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-8
2 tokens if the die shows 9-10
 23: 6
9
40 tokens if the die shows 1-9
32 tokens if the die shows 10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-9
2 tokens if the die shows 10
 30: 3
10 40 tokens if the die shows 1-10 A or B 77 tokens if the die shows 1-10  37
Note: One row was chosen for payment by use of a 10-sided die. Suppose choice 3 was chosen and the
subject chose A. Then another 10-sided die determined whether he would get 40 tokens or 32 tokens.
ipped a coin to determine which task was the payo¤ relevant for everyone. Then each
individual subject came to the front of the lab and ipped coins and/or rolled 10-sided dice
to determine their payment. In addition to the show-up fee, average pay from the lottery
choice was about 2.50 Euro for about 20 minutes. At the end there was a questionnaire
where we asked for subjectsgender.
To compare our results to risk elicitation tasks without the BLP, we collected results
and (partly) the whole data from other recent studies that took place in the same lab.
These studies implemented similar risk elicitation tasks but with prizes rather than tokens
as is usual in the literature. Table 3 lists the studies surveyed, with information on which
risk elicitation task each implemented and the number of observations. The Holt-Laury
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tasks used in all studies were exactly the same as the one in the current study up to a
scaling factor. The Eckel-Grossman tasks are less comparable since each study used a
di¤erent number and kind of lotteries.
Table 3: Survey of recent studies implementing risk elicitation tasks in the same lab
Study Risk Task Number of participants
Dürsch et al. (2012) (DOV) H&L 210
Brunner et al. (2014) (BHO) H&L 359
Roth et al. (2016) (RTV) H&L 104
Dürsch et al. (2017) (DRR) H&L 134
Apesteguia et al. (2018) (AOW) E&G 176
Kersting-Koenig et al. (2019) (LMK) E&G 199
Proto et al. (2019) (PRS) H&L 191
Schmidt (2019) (S) E&G 158
Note: E&G stands for Eckel & Grossman task and H&L stands for Holt & Laury task.
3 Results
Since we were employing the BLP, all subjects in our experiment should have switched from
A to B after the fourth choice in the Holt-Laury task and should have chosen lottery 3 in the
Eckel Grossman task.10 In Table 4 we report the proportions of choices that are compatible
with this payo¤maximizing prediction as Risk neutral. In the Eckel-Grossman task, only
34.45% of choices can be classied as risk neutral, in the Holt-Laury task this percentage
is even lower at 17.27, certainly far away from the predicted 100%. Binomial tests (risk
neutral vs. not risk neutral) show that these percentages are signicantly below 50%
(p < 0:001): Furthermore, strictly speaking the BLP should make subjects risk neutral
in both risk elicitation tasks simultaneously. However, this works only for 11 out of 110
subjects.11 Thus, it seems that the BLP clearly fails in letting all - or even a majority of -
subjects behave as if they are risk neutral.
Given the di¤erent ndings in the literature whether the BLP at least shifts the distrib-
ution of preferences towards risk neutrality, it is of course interesting to compare the share
of risk-neutral choices in studies with and without the BLP. For this purpose, we report in
10Under the assumptions of monotonicity and the reduction of objective compound lotteries.
11The switch point in Holt-Laury and the chosen lottery in Eckel-Grosman are however signicantly
correlated with a coe¢ cient of  0:20 (p = 0:039).
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Table 4: Elicited Risk Preference Classications.
Risk Preference Eckel & Grossman Holt & Laury
Classication Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Risk Averse 69 57.98 81 (81) 73.64 (68.06)
Risk Neutral 41 34.45 19 (19) 17.27 (15.97)
Risk Seeking 9 7.56 10 (19) 9.09 (15.97)
Total 119 110 (119)
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate the frequencies when we code multiple switchers in Holt-Laury by
their rst switching point.
Figures 1 and 2 the proportion of risk neutral participants for our study contrasted with
the studies outlined in Table 3. For the Eckel-Grossman task our results are slightly higher
than the comparison studies but very similar to two of the three studies.12 For Holt-Laury,
our data are in fact at the lower end of the spectrum in terms of the proportion of risk
neutral participants.13
As mentioned above, the Holt-Laury studies in Table 3 are directly comparable to the
current study since they all use the same lotteries (up to a scaling factor). The left panel
of Figure 3 shows the full frequency distribution of switch points in the Holt-Laury task
of our data (n = 110). The right panel shows the same for the pooled distribution of all
comparison studies (n = 947). Comparing the two panels it seems pretty obvious that there
is no noticeable shift towards the risk-neutral choice (indicated in red). A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two distributions are the
same (p = 0:33) despite the high number of observations.
4 Conclusion
This paper set out to re-examine the e¢ cacy of the Binary Lottery Procedure by using
standard risk preference elicitation tasks. Namely, we ask participants to respond to an
Eckel & Grossman type task as well as a Holt & Laury type task. The only tweak to these
12The LMK study has a much lower proportion of risk neutral participants than our data as well as the
other two comparison studies (AOW and S). This can be because in LMK they implement a longer list
of lotteries to choose from, namely participants were choosing one out of 11 lottery options. Any noise in
choices would then explain the lower percentage of risk neutral choices.
13As an aside, we nd the usual e¤ect that females in our study (n = 68) are signicantly more risk
averse in the Eckel-Grossman task (MWU-test, p = 0:002) than males (n = 51). The same holds with weak
signicance for the Holt-Laury task (p = 0:059).
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Figure 1: Proportion of Risk Neutral Participants in the Eckel-Grossman task: Comparing
across studies
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Figure 2: Proportion of Risk Neutral Participants in the Holt-Laury task: Comparing
across studies
Note: For the acronyms of studies see Table 3.
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Figure 3: Frequency distributions of switching points in the Holt-Laury task.
Note: Left panel: our data using the BLP procedure. Right panel: pooled data from H&L comparison
studies (listed in Table 3) in the same lab with monetary payo¤s. Marked in red is the switch point that
would correspond to a risk-neutral choice.
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procedures that we make is to have subjects choose across lotteries of tokens rather than
prize money, exactly as the Binary Lottery Procedure proposes. If the procedure worked
as proposed, we should observe all (or at least most) participants choosing lotteries that
maximize expected earnings and thus all appear to be risk neutral agents.
Putting together the results of the proportion of risk neutral agents, both in terms of
the modal response within our data and the comparison with other studies should put one
in serious doubt on whether BLP does indeed work in practice. Far from the majority of
participants are found to be risk neutral and in fact we nd no substantive di¤erences in the
occurrence of risk neutral preferences between our own data and other comparison studies
where similar risk elicitation procedures were implemented but with - as is standard - prize
money. Given how the Binary Lottery Procedure can complicate tasks for participants and
can be tedious in implementation and as it importantly appears to not work as hoped, it
seems redundant for experimenters to be utilizing it.
There may be, however, alternative methods for making subjects behave as if risk
neutral and there is some evidence that they work as intended. Kirchkamp et al. (2006)
tell subjects that their earnings in an auction are determined by the average of their payo¤s
from playing the auction multiple times (e.g. 50 times) with the same bidding function.
They then nd that bidding functions are much closer to the risk neutral equilibrium bids.
Similarly, Niemeyer et al. (2019) let subjects choose lotteries in a Holt-Laury task where
the payo¤ is determined by the average result of many drawings from the chosen lottery.
They nd that most subjects behave as if they are risk neutral.
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Appendix: Instructions
[These are translations of the original German instructions]
Please read these instructions carefully. Please do not talk to other participants. Please
turn o¤ your mobile phone and leave it turned o¤ until the end of the experiment. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand, and someone will come over. All participants
have received the same instructions.
This experiment consists of two decision problems. One of the decision problems will
be chosen for payment in the end by ipping a coin. Hence, you should work through both
parts carefully because both parts can be relevant for your payo¤.
Additionally to the payo¤ from the decision problem, each participant receives 5e for
participation.
All random decisions of coin ips and dice rolls will be made at the end of the experiment
by either yourself or some other volunteer with fair and genuine coins and dice.
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Decision problem 1
Decision problem 1 will be chosen for payo¤ if the ipped coin shows Tails.
In this experiment you have to make a choice among 4 lotteries. Each lottery has
two possible outcomes. The outcome will be decided by ipping a coin at the end of the
experiment (of course, this is independent of the coin above). Depending on whether the
coin comes up headsor tailsyou can win a number of tokens.
For example, in lottery 2 you win 52 tokens if heads comes up and 28 tokens if tails
comes up.
Tokens will later give you the opportunity to win 5 euro by the draw of a random
number between 1 and 100. Each random number between, and including, 1 and 100 is
equally likely to occur. In fact, you will be able to draw the two random numbers yourself
by rolling two 10-sided dice. The tokens give you the chance of winning the 5 euro. The
more points you earn, the greater your chance of winning 5 euro. In particular, if the
random number generated by the dice is equal or less than the number of tokens you own,
then you win 5 euro.
For example, if you chose lottery 2 and tails comes up, you win 28 tokens. If then the
dice produce a random number of 28 or less, you win 5 euro. If the random number is
higher than 28, you win nothing.
Now please choose one of the lotteries 1-4.
Lottery Tokens if coin shows Heads Tokens if coin shows Tails
Please choose exactly
one lottery
1 38 38 
2 52 28 
3 72 16 
4 84 0 
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Decision problem 2
Decision problem 2 will be chosen for payo¤ if the ipped coin shows Heads.
In this experiment you have to make a choice across 2 lotteries, A or B, in 10 di¤erent
cases. Each lottery has the same structure: with some probability, you receive a large
amount of tokens and with the residual probability, you will receive a smaller amount of
tokens. Which of the 10 choices will be the payo¤ relevant one will be decided by throwing
a 10-sided die at the end of the experiment. Further, the outcome of the chosen decision
will be decided by throwing a 10-sided die.
For example, say the 10-sided die rolls a 3 and in the third row you chose lottery A. If
now the 10-sided die rolls a number between 1 and 3, you receive 40 tokens and if it rolls
a number between 4 and 10, you receive 32 tokens.
Tokens will later give you the opportunity to win 5 euro by the draw of a random
number between 1 and 100. Each random number between, and including, 1 and 100 is
equally likely to occur. In fact, you will be able to draw the two random numbers yourself
by rolling two 10-sided dice. The tokens give you the chance of winning the 5 euro. The
more points you earn, the greater your chance of winning 5 euro. In particular, if the
random number generated by the dice is equal or less than the number of tokens you own,
then you win 5 euro.
Now please choose one of the lotteries A or B across the di¤erent cases below by
underlining your preferred lottery in the middle, in all 10 cases.
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Lottery A Your choice Lottery B
(please underline one
lottery in each row)
40 tokens if the die shows 1
32 tokens if the die shows 2-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1
2 tokens if the die shows 2-10
40 tokens if the die shows 1-2
32 tokens if the die shows 3-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-2
2 tokens if the die shows 3-10
40 tokens if the die shows 1-3
32 tokens if the die shows 4-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-3
2 tokens if the die shows 4-10
40 tokens if the die shows 1-4
32 tokens if the die shows 5-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-4
2 tokens if the die shows 5-10
40 tokens if the die shows 1-5
32 tokens if the die shows 6-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-5
2 tokens if the die shows 6-10
40 tokens if the die shows 1-6
32 tokens if the die shows 7-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-6
2 tokens if the die shows 7-10
40 tokens if the die shows 1-7
32 tokens if the die shows 8-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-7
2 tokens if the die shows 8-10
40 tokens if the die shows 1-8
32 tokens if the die shows 9-10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-8
2 tokens if the die shows 9-10
40 tokens if the die shows 1-9
32 tokens if the die shows 10
A or B
77 tokens if the die shows 1-9
2 tokens if the die shows 10
40 tokens if the die shows 1-10 A or B 77 tokens if the die shows 1-10
17
